>WhatsApp's encryption uses Signal Protocol, as detailed in their technical whitepaper. In systems that deploy Signal Protocol, each client is cryptographically identified by a key pair composed of a public key and a private key. The public key is advertised publicly, through the server, while the private key remains private on the user's device.
>This identity key pair is bound into the encrypted channel that's established between two parties when they exchange messages, and is exposed through the "safety number" (aka "security code" in WhatsApp) that participants can check to verify the privacy of their communication.
>Most end-to-end encrypted communication systems have something that resembles this type of verification, because otherwise an attacker who compromised the server could lie about a user's public key, and instead advertise a key which the attacker knows the corresponding private key for. This is called a "man in the middle" attack, or MITM, and is endemic to public key cryptography, not just WhatsApp.
>One fact of life in real world cryptography is that these keys will change under normal circumstances. Every time someone gets a new device, or even just reinstalls the app, their identity key pair will change. This is something any public key cryptography system has to deal with. WhatsApp gives users the option to be notified when those changes occur.
>While it is likely that not every WhatsApp user verifies safety numbers or safety number changes, the WhatsApp clients have been carefully designed so that the WhatsApp server has no knowledge of whether users have enabled the change notifications, or whether users have verified safety numbers. WhatsApp could try to "man in the middle" a conversation, just like with any encrypted communication system, but they would risk getting caught by users who verify keys.
>Under normal circumstances, when communicating with a contact who has recently changed devices or reinstalled WhatsApp, it might be possible to send a message before the sending client discovers that the receiving client has new keys. The recipient's device immediately responds, and asks the sender to reencrypt the message with the recipient's new identity key pair. The sender displays the "safety number has changed" notification, reencrypts the message, and delivers it.
>The WhatsApp clients have been carefully designed so that they will not re-encrypt messages that have already been delivered. Once the sending client displays a "double check mark," it can no longer be asked to re-send that message. This prevents anyone who compromises the server from being able to selectively target previously delivered messages for re-encryption.
>The fact that WhatsApp handles key changes is not a "backdoor," it is how cryptography works. Any attempt to intercept messages in transmit by the server is detectable by the sender, just like with Signal, PGP, or any other end-to-end encrypted communication system.
>The only question it might be reasonable to ask is whether these safety number change notifications should be "blocking" or "non-blocking." In other words, when a contact's key changes, should WhatsApp require the user to manually verify the new key before continuing, or should WhatsApp display an advisory notification and continue without blocking the user.
Connor Carter
If you trust a man with that nose you deserve to be lied to.
Carson Johnson
>Given the size and scope of WhatsApp's user base, we feel that their choice to display a non-blocking notification is appropriate. It provides transparent and cryptographically guaranteed confidence in the privacy of a user's communication, along with a simple user experience. The choice to make these notifications "blocking" would in some ways make things worse. That would leak information to the server about who has enabled safety number change notifications and who hasn't, effectively telling the server who it could MITM transparently and who it couldn't; something that WhatsApp considered very carefully.
>Even if others disagree about the details of the UX, under no circumstances is it reasonable to call this a "backdoor," as key changes are immediately detected by the sender and can be verified. The reporting
>The way this story has been reported has been disappointing. There are many quotes in the article, but it seems that the Guardian put very little effort into verifying the original technical claims they've made. Even though we are the creators of the encryption protocol supposedly "backdoored" by WhatsApp, we were not asked for comment.
>Instead, most of the quotes in the story are from policy and advocacy organizations who seem to have been asked "WhatsApp put a backdoor in their encryption, do you think that's bad?"
>We believe that it is important to honestly and accurately evaluate the choices that organizations like WhatsApp or Facebook make. There are many things to criticize Facebook for; running a product that deployed end-to-end encryption by default for over a billion people is not one of them.
Asher Morales
Fpbp
Aaron Martinez
Use Signal, goyim!
Easton Watson
Nothing wrong here
Colton Howard
Trust me
Julian Miller
I mean I never disrespect anyone to their face, but the minute I start seeing people with excessive tats, dreads, pink or other unnatural hair, I instantly acknowledge in my mind that they likely don't have anything of value to say
that being said, lol, only a fool would trust the white guy with dreads
Hudson Ortiz
stop this virulent antimerchantism
Logan Bell
>white guy
Look closer
Adrian Phillips
yes white
Jace Reyes
>(((white)))
Robert Taylor
I remember Moxie.
Back around 2009 he wrote sslstrip which let me MITM my friends and neighbor's https connections. The good old script kiddy days.
He's been around in the security community for a while and knows his shit, just saying.
Alexander Hill
>white guy
hahaha
your parents didn't teach you?
Blake Long
>none of this addresses the client proprietary nature How much did he jew out of Goybook?
Zachary Mitchell
Why wouldn't I believe an unaudited closed source encrypted chat application is safe? stop being so paranoid, user :^)
Dylan Taylor
holy fuck this guy really looks like a jew
Jack Bennett
White guy my ass.
That's the jewiest jew I've ever laid eyes on...goddamn that nose is huge.
(((white)))
Jordan Campbell
Many shekels, goy
Asher Allen
>trust us, goy. Whatsapp is safe. Just because we can't see the source code doesn't mean it's unsafe!
Camden Cook
Is Sup Forums ever wrong?
Alexander Bell
Very very rarely
Cooper Diaz
He's also a CMU grad, he definitely knows his shit.
He also is very open on his own project's forums and other places, there's no WhatsApp backdoor.
You can reverse any binary and see exactly what it does, including WhatsApp.
Aiden Russell
Then why do we prefer open source software?
Jayden Ortiz
people on this site are so eager to discriminate lol. and its obvious its due because most of you guys are already bottom of the barrel in the hierarchy.
Aiden Martinez
Who bullied you as a kid?
Henry Brown
stop discriminating and bullying us! It's rude! Can't even be racist on the internet anymore without being bullied. Sad.
Owen Bailey
>(((Rosenfeld)))
Sebastian Carter
>There is no WhatsApp 'backdoor'
Ha ha, okay!
Levi Jones
Man it's been a while since I've seen that name
Austin Barnes
Matty shilling for good boy points because nobody wants to acquire his useless business, that's so sweet.
Michael Johnson
MOXIE MARLINKIKE STRIKES AGAIN.
Mason Carter
>"safety number" (aka "security code" in WhatsApp) This bullshit needs to go. Why are we sugarcoating concepts for the masses? Call it a fingerprint, as it's always been called. It makes perfect fucking sense every time. "Security code" sounds like something I input to get past a door and "safety number" sounds like something I use in case I get locked out of my safe.
Austin Reyes
I wrote this post and have since read about the Signal protocol, and WhatsApp, and how Facebook is involved.
The fact that Facebook is involved is a big red flag. Apparently other instant messengers have implemented the Signal protocol such as Google. All these "instant messenger" apps with a cumulative 1 billion+ users are probably backdoored somehow. No proof, just an intuition (gut) feeling.
Logan Johnson
...
Michael Richardson
You are doing exactly the same faggot. Fuck off to your safe space subreddit.
Brandon Hall
The Signal Protocol is fine desu. I fucked around with the python port of it and I'm digging the Double Ratchet algorithm. Problem is, I don't give a fuck how good your protocol is, if it's delivered via a proprietary client, it can go fuck itself.
James James
the nose, KNOWS!!!
Charles Butler
I would add anime or pony avatars to that.
Mason Rogers
You don't think the double ratchet might be compromised somehow? After all, Dual_EC_DRBG was backdoored and no one knew explicitly how.
John Foster
These big Jewish-run companies hired a small Jewish-run company to make them appear as if they care about encryption to fool the goyim into using their products.
It's as simple as that. For all you know, Signal binaries could also be backdoored because 99% of people don't compile from the source code.
Wyatt Adams
Way more than that
Hudson Rodriguez
pic related looks like a young Nic Cage
Brandon Butler
>implying they personally audit the source You are poor niggers or jews, that's why.
Daniel Phillips
yeah, and the weed he sells doesn't contain any traces of household cleaning products
>respectable young CEO of a company worth $19B
Elijah Perry
experience huh?
Easton Lewis
...
Alexander Gutierrez
It's been independently reviewed and audited. DUAL_EC was immediately obvious as both a poor choice due to its slow performance and also a likely backdoored algorithm almost as soon as it was released. I think there are papers from as early as 2005 speculating that it contained a backdoor.
